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I
WHAT IS A PROFESSION? THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN ANTIQUITY

W HAT
do we mean by the term "profession?" Is it any
more today than a name for certain callings which

have
a traditional dignity and for certain other callings which in
recent times have achieved or claim a like dignity? The distinction between the professional and the amateur, of which
we have heard so much in the absorbing interest of sport, has
done much to make a professional connote a money-making
activity. In the face of the modes of thought engendered by
sport, it is not easy to impart to this generation the conception
of a group of men pursuing a common calling as a learned art
and as a public service-no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood. In the practice of law
we have never lost this older idea of a profession of lawyers.
Yet it was sorely tried in the reign of pioneer modes of thought
in nineteenth-century America. Recent investigations of combinations of lawyers, physicians, and their runners in some
of our large cities, show how a purely business conception and
business organization, along the lines which govern in commercial and industrial activities, may grow up as a spontane-
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ous product of the conditions of practice in large urban communities, and may impair the public administration of justice.
Historically, there are three ideas involved in a profession,
organization, learning, and a spirit of public service. These
are essential. The remaining idea, that of gaining a livelihood,
is incidental.
It is true today that almost every calling is organized in
some sort of trade association. Also it is true that, except as
a growing number of states have gone back to the commonlaw organized profession of lawyers, in many and in some of
our most important states we have no all-inclusive or responsible organization. An increasing number of states have incorporated their bars. But the profession in most of the older
states still look upon this as a doubtful innovation. In half of
our jurisdictions there is no bar in the sense of the Bar of
England or the Faculty of Advocates in Scotland, or the Colleges or Societies of advocates in continental Europe. Simply
there are so many hundred or so many thousand lawyers, each
a law unto himself, and for most practical purposes, it must
be said, accountable only to God and his conscience-if any.
Yet you must not infer from this that an organized profession of lawyers is wholly analogous to a retail grocers' association, or that there is no difference between an organized bar
and plumbers' or lumber dealers' associations. The conditions
of an unorganized body of lawyers in the United States in the
last century made bar associations in some respects seem like
trade associations. But the profession as organized in the rest
of the world is another thing, and the want of organization
with us was a remnant of a general attempt to deprofessionalize the traditionally professional callings and put all callings
in one category in all respects which was characteristic of the
formative era of American institutions. Even without formal
organization, the legal profession in this country has on the
whole preserved a tradition of solidarity and traditional incidents of professional organization which have been of much
value for our administration of justice. But the ideal of the
profession involves an inclusive and responsible organization,
and a movement back to that ideal has been gaining in
strength.
A true profession, both in idea and as a matter of history,
is a learned profession. An unlearned profession is a contra-
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diction in terms. Learning, the pursuit of a learned art, is one
of the things which distinguishes a profession from a calling
or vocation or occupation. Professions are learned not only
from the nature of the art professed but because they have
historically a cultural, an ideal side which furthers the effective exercise of that art. Problems of human relations in
society, problems of disease, problems of the upright life
guided by religion are to be dealt with by the resources of
cultivated intelligence by lawyer, physician, and clergyman,
and to carry on their tasks they must be more than resourceful craftsmen, they must be learned men.
What is most important, however, a profession is'practised
in a spirit of public service. "A trade," says Professor Palmer,
"aims primarily at personal gain; a profession at the exercise
of powers beneficial to mankind." In a society in which free
competitive self-assertion seemed the basis of the social order,
lawyer and grocer and farmer alike seemed to be freely competing in order to acquire, each for himself, as much of the
world's goods as he might honorably. But we are having to
outgrow that conception. The lawyer is not bartering his services as is the artisan, nor exchanging the products of his
skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There is
no such thing as a lawyers' or physicians' or clergymens' or
teachers' strike. The professional man does not measure out
his service in proportion to reward, even if, when he can do
so, he measures his honorarium by the extent of service rendered. 1-is best service is often rendered for no equivalent, or
for a trifling equivalent, and it is his pride to do what he does
in a way worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation of reward. "No professional man," says Professor Palmer, "thinks of giving according to measure. Once engaged
he gives his best, gives his personal interest, himself ....
The
real payment is the work itself, this and the chance to join
with other members of the profession in guiding and enlarging the sphere .of its activities."
It would be idle to assert that there is nothing of selfishness in the pursuit of a profession. But its ideal is not one of
individual success in competitive acquisitive activity. And
because ideals operate powerfully to shape action, professional
activity, even at its worst, is restrained and guided by something better than the desire for money rewards.
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Today many other callings beside the three or four original
professional callings, law, medicine, the ministry, teaching,
are claiming professional status. Such, for example, are journalism, engineering, business administration. Each of these,
as is true indeed in greater or less degree of all callings, renders a public service while also providing a livelihood. Each is
coming to involve the application of what is or may be a
learned art. Each may very likely be carried on in the spirit
of a public service. It is significant that whereas one hundred
years ago Americans were inclined to deprofessionalize callings, they now seek to reprofessionalize the older professions
and to professionalize many new callings.
This change of attitude seems to be part of a general movement away from the extreme regime of competitive individual
self-assertion which prevailed in the last century and toward
a regime of cooperation. However this may be, in the course
of such a movement it is a great advantage to the original
established and recognized professional callings that they have
a tradition of organization, of learning, and of a spirit of service, so that it will prove easier to set them in line with the
requirements of the future than callings in which such traditions must emerge and establish themselves by a slow process
of growth.
Let us begin, then, with the assumption that you are entering upon a profession with a long and honorable history, high
ideals, and great traditions-"an order," says D'Aguesseau,
"as old as the magistracy, as noble as virtue, as necessary
as
justice."
If it were possible to make a system of law a body of plain
simple rules, capable of offhand infallible interpretation by
any plain man, there might be no need of counsel to assist
judges by argument as to the meaning and application of laws.
But it is not possible to have a complete body of plain and
simple rules of this sort. The essence of life is change and laws
must govern the conduct of life. However, plain and simple
the rule, the facts to which it must be applied change continually and so deprive it of the clarity of meaning and simplicity
of application which it may once have had. Lawyers are not
needed to wrest plain rules from their plain meaning but to
give to rules which have never been or have ceased to be plain
in all their applications a meaning which will achieve the pur-
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poses of justice. As I have said elsewhere: "let us not forget
that so-called interpretation is not merely ascertainment of
the legislative intent. If it were, it would be the easiest instead
of the most difficult of judicial tasks. Where the legislature
has had an intent and has sought to express it there is seldom
a question of interpretation. The difficulties arise in the myriad cases in respect to which the lawmaker has no intention
because he had never thought of them. Indeed, perhaps he
could never have thought of them." Yet such cases must be
decided, and the general security requires that they be settled
by law, i.e., by applying an authoritative technique to the laws
provided for like cases. This can be done well only after argument by those who know the technique and have had experience in applying it.
Nor are questions of fact, on which tribunals must pass,
as a rule, so simple or so easy to solve that the untrained man
may pass upon them with assurance without trained assistance. Questions of fact between A and B are seldom presented
as a plain proposition that A owes B. Usually that simple
result follows from a complicated series of disputed facts,
very possibly disputed in good faith at each step in the series.
It is a rare controversy which does not have two sides, each
believed in, in good faith, by honest men. In order to decide
such controversies satisfactorily, the case of each party must
be presented thoroughly ad skilfully, so that things are put in
their proper setting and the tribunal may review the whole
case intelligently and come to a conclusion with assurance
that nothing has been overlooked, nothing misapprehended,
and nothing wrongly valued. The litigant cannot do this for
himself. It can only be done by well trained specialists.
Proper presentation by a skilled advocate saves the time
of the courts and so public time and expense. It helps the court
by sifting out the relevant facts in advance, putting them in
logical order, working out their possible legal consequences,
and narrowing the questions which the judge must decide to
the really crucial points. Good advocacy reduces the work
which falls upon the judges to a minimum of decision upon the
vital points in carefully sifted materials. When it is remembered that courts in our large cities often have over one
hundred thousand or even more than one hundred and fifty
thousand cases before them in a year, the importance of this
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saving of the time and energy of the judges will be appreciated. Experience has shown abundantly the waste involved
in inexpert presentation of causes by laymen or inexperienced
or inept practitioners. The litigant who argues his case in
person is proverbially a pest of the courts. It requires training and experience to enable one to order the materials, select
the significant items, appreciate the legal bearings of each,
and direct argument to the controlling points. Stevenson says
that the difference between Homer and an ordinary poet is
that Homer knew what to leave out. Certainly, understanding
of what, in a complicated mass of details, should be left out,
is the test of the advocate. The layman arguing his own case
is likely to assume that all the facts and all the items of a
course of dealing were created free and equal.
Along with training and experience, advocacy in order to
be a help to the courts and an aid to the administration of
justice demands the professional spirit. In order to further
justice, in order to insure that the machinery of justice is not
perverted, those who operate the machinery must not merely
know how to operate it. They must have a deep sense of things
that are done and things that are not done. They need the
guiding restraint of a professional spirit to prevent misuse
of the machinery, to prevent waste of public time in useless
wrangling, to promote proper forensic treatment of witnesses,
so that witnesses will not be unwilling to come forward to testify. They need it to inspire confidence on the part of courts
in being able to rely upon what counsel represent to them,
instead of having to waste time in looking up everything
because unable to assume the face of things as presented by
the advocates.
Nor is the agent's function superfluous in the world of
today. Simply from an economic standpoint there is a very
great saving of public time and public money in having cases
prepared thoroughly and intelligently in advance of trial. The
trial brief, prepared carefully beforehand for the advocate,
insures that the crucial points will be distinguished from
irrelevant details and completely presented, that time will not
be wasted in futile quests for evidence which a preliminary
investigation would have shown does not exist, and that the
energies of judge and advocate will be directed to the real
issues in the controversy. Nothing could be more mistaken
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than the notion that the activities of attorneys and the technical requirements of proof are causes of needless delay. I remember sitting as a member of an athletic board to try an
athlete accused of professionalism. The case against him was
based on a postal card in which he was said to have accepted
an offer to hire him for summer baseball at a resort. Many
testified to having seen the card and to its contents and when
I suggested that it would be better to produce or account for
the card itself, I was told that we would have no technicalities
but would hear all the evidence and decide on the merits. So
the hearsay evidence went on till finally the card was found
and produced and it turned out that the principal accuser had
misread it and started unfounded rumors which were all there
was of the case. A lawyer working up the case would have
demanded to see the card and would not have rested till he
found it or it was accounted for. That would have ended the
matter. It would not have taken half a day of tial to show
there was nothing to try.
As to the function of advising upon the law, it is enough to
say that every man his own lawyer is as wasteful as every
man his own advocate. When a layman draws his own will, he
seldom appreciates the contingencies which must be provided
for. When the will comes to be carried out, the courts must
find out whathe meant, and the difficulties will arise, not from
his untechnical statement of what he meant, but from his not
having meant anything about matters which must be settled
from his words. Lay-drawn wills and conveyances drawn by
real estate agents and notaries public are a notorious source
of wasteful litigation.
It remains to note the branches of professional activity.
Perhaps the oldest is the adviser's function-the function of
advising as to how to conduct legal transactions and bring and
defend legal proceedings. Out of this develops the law-teaching function and the jurisconsult's or law-writer's function.
Another function hardly less old than that of the adviser is
that of the agent or attorney. A later development is that of
the advocate. In addition, there are certain specialized functions, as, for example, those of special pleaders and of conveyancers, which have or have had importance at one time or
another. These functions, or some of them, may be highly
specialized and performed by independently organized groups

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

of practitioners, or may be combined in various ways, or may
be undifferentiated in a common body of lawyers, as in the
United States. The aggregate of those who perform these
functions or some one of them under license from some public
authority may be called the profession of law.
Turning now to the beginnings of the legal profession in
antiquity, we may start from law and lawyers in Greece, sirfce
Rome learned from Greece, the Middle Ages from Rome, and
we from the Middle Ages.

LAW AND LAWYERS IN GREECE

Greek law is the law of city-states. But in classical Greek
thinking, law in the lawyer's sense is not clearly differentiated
from other agencies of social control. We must remember that
even today, after law, recognized or established and enforced
by politically organized society, has become the paramount
agency of social control, it by no means bears the whole burden. The internal discipline of the household, the internal
discipline of religious organizations, of fraternal organizations, of trade, professional and business associations, and of
social clubs, as well as neighborhood, community, and general
public opinion, still play a large part in constraining men to
avoid anti-social activities and leading or pushing them into
the paths indicated for the maintenance and furtherance of
civilization. In classical Greece these things are not well differentiated from law. The Greek word which we translate as law
is used to mean ethical custom, religious rites, law in general,
a rule of law, and social control as a whole.
Moreover, while the Greek city was a politically organized
society, it was very close to and in some respects in transition
from a kin-organized society. Much of its ethical custom and
codified customary law spoke from an older tribal society. It
was at most tending to, but had by no menas attained a stage
of, what might be called strict law-that is, one in which social
control through norms recognized or established by politically
organized society has been set off definitely from religion and
ethical custom and is governed by ideas of certainty and uniformity in that ordering and of rule and form as the means
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thereto. Classical Greek law was tending toward but had by
no means attained this stage of legal development. In consequence, classical Greece did not develop lawyers, for law and
lawyers go together. Yet here, as in nearly every connection
in~the social sciences, the germs of our institutions may be
found in Greece.
In a kin-organized society and in a religious-organized
society the received forms of transactions, the received modes
of appealing to the king or magistrate for redress, and the
received norms of decision are a tradition of a priestly caste,
or, later, of an oligarchy by which alone they are known and
handed down. Hence when one wished to know how to carry
out a transaction in such wise as to give it legal efficacy, or
how to bring a legal proceeding, or how to carry on a litigation, or how to predict a decision, or, if called- on to judge a
controversy, how to decide, he consulted some one of those
who knew the received tradition. We shall see presently in
another connection how at Rome these repositories of the
received tradition grew into jurisconsults. In Greece also we
see the germ of the jurisconsult's function in what were called
interpreters.
According to the Greek dictionary-writers of antiquity,
from whom most of our information comes, these interpreters
were resorted to for authoritative pronouncements on the traditional law. But this traditional law, so-called, was much
wider than what we should call law. It included religious rites
and usages, so that of the three categories of interpreters,
described in the sources, only one had to do with authoritative
materials of judicial decisions. Indeed, where causes were
decided by large bodies of citizens analogous to popular assemblies, no interpreter could predict what the course of decision
would prove to be and the advice of the interpreter was not so
much counsel as to the law as a general explanation of the
probably expedient course of action. At Athens in cases of
homicide, arson, and some like crimes, jurisdiction was in the
Council of the Aeropagus, made up of the acting and former
magistrates, and that tribunal was governed by traditional
custom. In this limited field there was scope for the jurisconsult's function. Beyond this the interpreters ceased to be of
importance. They have been said to be "a special group of
jurisconsults." But this is far-fetched and doubtful.
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Another type of person of whom we must take account are
the scribes. But they can hardly be thought of as lawyers
although some part of the lawyer's function has been differentiated from their manifold tasks. The scribe is an oriental
institution, while the lawyer comes rather from the west.
On the other hand, we may trace a continuous development
of the advocate of today from those who represented or assisted others in litigation in Greek tribunals.
In primitive law, the kin group rather than the individual
is the legal unit. Hence, in the beginnings of law, in politically
organized societies still close to an older kin-organization,
dependents are represented before tribunals by the head of
the kin group. If one is not a dependent, he must represent
himself. There is no advocacy. The kin group speaks through
its head on behalf of dependents because their cause is its
cause. The kinless man, the emancipated man, the man who is
not a dependent, speaks for himself. So it was in Athens and
doubtless in Greece generally.
Yet there. were certain exceptions and relaxations. A city
could only speak through a representative, and in public prosecutions (for the beginnings of law do not distinguish crime
and tort and the normal proceeding to enforce a penalty is
private) and impeachments a representative of the public
was called for in the nature of the case. Also an accused might
call in some one (probably originally a kinsman or the head
of the kin group) to stand beside him and assist him, and to
a less extent this sort of assistance was allowed to an accuser.
Also in certain rare cases the tribunal might authorize a parent, a friend, or a member of the same tribe to complete or
supplement the explanation of his case made by the party in
person. One who thus represented a city or the public or assisted accused or accuser or supplemented another's exposition
of his case was called a synegoros. He was to some degree an
advocate. The same name, synegoros, was given to one who
was chosen to speak on behalf of the state with respect to
proposed legislation.
A more significant institution for our purpose is that of
the speech-writer (logographos).
In order to understand his function we must remember
that in the Athenian polity there was little of what we now
call separation of powers. Political and judicial functions were
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little differentiated. The citizen was both legislator and judge.
The people judging and the people deliberating and legislating
were not well distinguished. The ordinary tribunal was a large
body of citizens under oath to decide a particular cause and
addressed not as jurors (dikasts) but as citizens. These dikasteries, as they were called, might contain as few as two
hundred and one or four hundred and one, or as many as
fifteen hundred and one citizens. Obviously, it was a difficult
task for the ordinary man, even at Athens, where citizens
were accustomed to public speaking in the political assemblies,
to present one's own case before so large a tribunal. The timid,
the inexperienced, the ignorant were at a great disadvantage
before such a court as compared with a single judge, who by
questioning can patiently and skilfully bring out what is to
be said on both sides. In the Greek trial each party made a
speech in the course of which he adduced evidence, brought
forward witnesses, and cross-examined his adversary in connection with his several points as he went along with his
narrative. The speech was undifferentiated, or little differentiated, narrative, proofs, and argument. In a case of any
complexity it called for a degree of skill beyond the everyday
citizen. Hence the average litigant employed a speech-writer
or logograph who, for a fee, drew up a speech and turned it
over to his client. The client learned it by heart and delivered
it before the tribunal.
Obviously, the speech-writer was not an advocate. Yet the
Roman orator, from whom the advocate of today is derived
historically, took the Greek orator for his model. Moreover,
the successful speech-writer had to be something very like a
lawyer. He had to be well versed in Athenian law and procedure. He might have to argue that the popular tribunal
should adhere to the law. In the next case he might have to
argue that the tribunal, as juries sometimes do, should run
away with the law and decide on sympathy or emotion or lay
ideas of a square deal. In either event he had to know the law
which was to be applied or dispensed with. Also he had to
know the psychology of the Athenian juries and be sensitive
to their passions and prejudices. Above all, he had to know
how to adapt the speech which he wrote to the age, the condition, the character of his clients and make it seem to flow
naturally from the mouth of the speaker. All this is closely
akin to the task of the advocate.
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There was no clear differentiation of the agent's function
from that of the advocate. Indeed, syndic (which came to mean
agent) and synegoros (which denoted something very like an
advocate) are often used as synonyms. Syndic means etymologically one who intervenes in a legal proceeding. Obviously,
a city-state, a foundation, an association, and the like, could
not appear in court in person. They could only be represented
by agents. It is significant that the name given to these agents
was the same as that given to the representative of a citystate before the Amphictyonic Council, but also the same as
that often given to synegoroi, and to one who assisted the
demarch, or presiding official of an Attic deme, or township,
in a prosecution or when the deme was proceeded against
before the popular tribunals.
In Greece we have the beginnings of lawyers rather than
lawyers as we know them in developed legal systems.
2
LAW AND LAWYERS AT ROME

I
The Development of Representation at Rome
In the Roman law of the later republic and especially in
the classical Roman law of the early empire, we find law in the
sense of the legal ordering of society well set off from other
agencies of social control and law in the sense of an authoritative body of materials for the guidance of judicial action
well differentiated from ethical custom, religion, and public
opinion. Also, there is a well developed legal procedure, with
a system of actions leading to defined remedies and grounded
in defined legal duties established by definite legal precepts by
which the judges consider themselves bound. In other words,
there is law in the lawyer's sense.
In the later republic and early empire, an intending litigant had to go before the praetor or judicial magistrate and
point out the particular provision of the edict upon which he
relied as the basis of his action. One not thoroughly versed in
the law would need advice or, better, would need someone to
make the application to the judicial magistrate on his behalf.
But there was another difficulty which called no less or
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even more for representation of litigants before the magistrate in the preliminaries of legal proceedings. As the Roman
state outgrew the confines of the city of Rome, the persons on
whose behalf applications were to be made to the praetor of
Rome, and those who had to ask that the formula include a
statement of their defense, might live at a distance and it
might be very inconvenient for them to be at Rome to make
personal applications and requests. Also, as the law of the city
of Rome came to be the law of the world, litigation according
to the Roman law was carried on in the provinces. In the
provinces the governor had the jurisdiction and authority of
the Roman praetor. But the provinces were often of wide
extent and there was the same difficulty and inconvenience in
personal attendance and personal applications. This need for
representation in legal procedure led to a practice of appointing agents or attorneys.
There were two modes of appointing a representative for
litigation, the formal and the informal. The agent appointed
by the older or formal mode was called a cognitor. He had to
be appointed by the party using a set form of words in the
presence of his adversary. The person named as cognitor might
be either present or absent, but if absent it was required that
he consent and undertake the attorneyship.
An agent for litigation appointed by the later and informal
mode was called a procurator.He might be appointed by any
words amounting to instructions to sue or defend, as the case
might be, and without the presence or even the knowledge of
the adverse party. Indeed, it was enough that the procurator
undertook the agency in good faith and undertook that his
principal would ratify what he did. He could begin an action
without producing his instructions and it became a usual practice not to produce the instructions until the trial before the
judex. Thus far, you will have seen, the procedure was very
much as by an attorney at common law or solicitor in chancery or by a proctor in the ecclesiastical courts or the civil
law.
Roman law, however, did not have modern ideas of agency.
What the agent did was not thought of as done by his principal. What the agent did he did himself, as the law saw it.
But he was bound contractually that the benefit of what he did
should inure to his principal and the principal was bound con-
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tractually to indemnify the agent for loss and expense incurred
in his carrying out the agency in good faith. Applying these
notions to procedure and bearing in mind the idea of the
beginnings of law that parties other than dependents must
carry on their legal proceedings in person, it is evident that
the plaintiff's cognitor or procurator must be taken to be
carrying on his own case and the defendant's cognitor or procurator to be defending his own case. Hence if, let us say,
Lucius Titius (The Roman John Stiles) is cognitor or procurator for Aulus Agerius (let us say Peter Plaintiff) who is
suing Numerius Negidius (let us say Dan Defendant), the
formula delivered to the judex would read: "If it is proved
that Numerius Negidius ought to pay to Aulus Agerius ten
thousand sesterces, 0 judex condemn Numerius Negidius to
pay to Lucius Titius ten thousand sesterces." In like manner,
if Negidius was defending by a cognitor,say Publius Maevius,
the formula would say that if it was proved that Negidius
owed Agerius ten thousand sesterces, the judex was to condemn Maevius to pay Titius that amount. Thus the judgment
might be in favor of one attorney and against another, on the
case of one principal against the other. But there was a contractual duty on the one side to account for the benefit of the
judgment and on the other to idemnify against it. Accordingly,
an action might be brought by the attorneys or by the parties
as the case might require, to charge the real defendant with
the judgment, or to give the real plaintiff the benefit of it.
Later, the simpler device obtained of a transfer of the judgment to and against the real parties by operation of law. When
this step had been taken the agents for litigation had become
truly attorneys.
In Justinian's law (and before) the formal mode of appointment of cognitors had become obsolete. Also much old
law as to objections which a defendant might interpose as to
the competency of a procuratorhad been done away with. The
praetor's edict had forbidden persons under the age of seventeen, the deaf, the blind, women, and persons of bad character
from making applications on behalf of others in litigation.
Soldiers also were not competent to act, even on behalf of a
parent or wife, and could only represent themselves so far as
they could do so without breach of discipline. Thus it is evident
that while there was no profession of attorneys or agents for
litigation, and except for the cases prohibited by the edict, any
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one might be appointed for the case in hand, yet certain persons had begun regularly to act in this way.
We know from Latin writers of the Empire that there
were habitual practitioners in the courts who were of a very
low type, despite the provisions as to character in the praetor's edict. Perhaps one need not say that to allow the defendant to challenge the character of the plaintiff's lawyer, by
way of a dilatory plea, and thus put off a trial of the merits,
was to offer a cure worse than the disease. It provided no
effective check upon the low and unscrupulous type of practitioner which is apt to develop from the need of representation in litigation and the opportunities which that need offers
for preying on the ignorant and extorting from the timid. So
long as a body of agents for litigation is unorganized, subjected to little or no scrutiny before entering upon that calling,
and without the check of discipline by responsible authority,
serious abuses have always followed.
Much remained to be done before the Roman procurator
became the attorney or solicitor of today. Yet when we compare the procuratorwith the beginnings of agency in litigation
in Greece, we must recognize that great progress has been
made. The old idea that the litigant must conduct his case in
person had disappeared as to the technical legal proceedings
leading to the trial. A class of, on the whole, skilled and experienced agents for litigation had developed, and the crude
idea of the agent as assuming the litigation had been superseded by a recognition of the agent for what he was, a tepresentative, and of the principals as the real litigants. There
had even been some development of judicial checks upon the
personnel of the calling. The praetors had at least tried to
confine the calling to men of good character in a position to
give their time to cases without interfering with their other
tasks. Thus when we leave the Roman law in its final form for
the ancient world, we are well upon the road to one important
branch of the legal profession as we know it today.
II
The Development of Advocacy at Rome
In order to understand the role of the advocate at Rome,
we must look somewhat more closely at Roman legal proced-

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

ure. First, then, of criminal procedure. In some cases, after
preliminary inquiry and condemnation before a magistrate,
there was appeal to and trial before an assembly of the people.
This trial before the people necessarily came to an end when
a world state succeeded to a city state under the empire. In
other cases, the prosecution was tried before what we may
well call a jury of from thirty-two to seventy-five judices.
This trial before a jury decayed under the empire and an
inquisitorial procedure before magistrates developed in its
place. In others, a penalty was sued for according to the course
of a civil proceeding. Here there was a trial before one or more
(sometimes a considerable number) of judices. Thus Roman
criminal procedure of the classical era afforded much the same
scope for an orator as trials before the popular tribunals at
Athens:
As to civil procedure, it was divided into two stages-a
stage in lure before the magistrate, and a stage in judicio
before the trier or triers.
In the stage before the praetor or judicial magistrate the
purpose was to frame the issues to be tried and appoint a
judex or a number of judices to try them. There might be a
heraing at this point as to whether the action desired should
be given to the plaintiff. If it was allowed, the praetor settled
the formula or set of instructions to the judex, containing
what in our law we should call the pleadings of the parties
and directions as to what judgment to enter in case certain
issues were found or not found.
When the formula was complete, the parties joined in what
is called the procedural contract. That is, they undertook to
abide the result of the submission to the judex and the judgment was binding on them by virtue of that contract. Under
the later empire the judex is no longer a private person chosen
as arbitrator, he is an official. The plaintiff submits a written
statement of his case and the defendant in like manner a written statement of his defense. There is no formal procedural
contract. Also, the court could refer some particular point to
the oath of a party, leaving other issues to be tried, so that a
cause might not be tried as a whole but only on issues remaining unsettled.
At the trial, there might be speeches with introduction of
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evidence in the course of the speech, as in the Greek practice,
or speeches followed by evidence, or a spech for the plaintiff,
a speech for the defendant, opening their respective cases,
then evidence on each side, then speeches by way of summing
up; or there might be evidence followed by speeches on each
side. There was no limit to the number of orators who might
speak, but, though six are known to have spoken on each side
in one case, usually there were not more than four on a side.
Also, one might speak on his own behalf and have his argument reinforced by the speeches of from, one to four orators.
When more than one they were supposed to divide the points.
But Cicero tells us that they frequently forgot this and made
separate set speeches without having heard the argument they
were to answer. Thus they tired the court by going over the
ground already traversed by those who had preceded them.
Originally, the proceedings in Judicio took place in the
forum; and we have spoken of a court and of a place where
orators are heard as a forum ever since. Strictly, the forum
was the market place, the natural place of meeting for the
ordinary folk of the city. It was in an irregularly shaped open
space between the Capitoline hill and the Palatine hill, narrowing at the end next the Palatine with a branch of the sacred
way on either side. The narrower end was the Comitium or
meeting place of the assembly of citizens in the earliest times.
The wider end was the forum. The Comitium was raised above
the level of the forum. The rostra or platforms for public
speaking were at the end of the Comitium nearest the forum,
so that the speakers, who in old times had addressed the assembled citizens, could speak to the senators who were wont to
stand here outside the senate house. But later, the speakers
turned toward the forum and spoke to the body of the people
who were assembled on that side, and the forum came to be
used chiefly for judicial proceedings. Still later, basilicas were
built around the forum and were used for the trial of civil
actions, state trials, however, still taking place in the forum.
The word basilica means literally "royal." So a basilica is a
royal hall, i.e., one in which the king sat to do justice. The
Roman basilica was an oblong building with a broad nave
ending in a semi-circular apse and flanked by colonaded aisles
or porticos. As the matters coming before tribunals became
more complicated and as permanent judges began to sit in
them, the old open air trial became obsolete and the trials
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were held in the basilica. In Christian times basilicas were
taken for churches, and the court house became the model for
the church.
Roman practice permitted a litigant to be represented at
the trial by an advocate. But he was not called advocate originally. Cicero tells us that an advocate was one who assisted
with advice on points of law or by his presence as a person
of influence gave weight to one side of a case. One who engaged
in public speaking, either in the popular assemblies or in the
courts, was called an orator. He was, like Cicero, both statesman and advocate. When he appeared in court to argue, he was
called a patronus causarum or simply patronus,and the person
he represented was called a client. These terms take us back
to the origin of Roman advocacy in the relation of the head
of a patrician household to his dependents in the polity of the
old city. In that polity those who were not members of patrician households attached themselves to some household as
dependents, and slaves who were freed were still in a relation
to the master who had freed them and was said to be their
patron. These dependents were called clients. They were entitled to be protected by the patron. Particularly, the patron
was bound to appear in court for his clients, originally as
representing the kin group of which they were taken to be
members, and to explain the law to them, since knowledge of
the old customary law of the city was a monopoly of the heads
of patrician households. Thus this duty of the patron toward
his client was the basis both of the advocate's function and of
the jurisconsult's function as they developed at Rome.
In the beginning, the patron, as to his dependents, was both
jurisconsult and advocate-both legal advisor and trial lawyer. Indeed, even in the classical period, although a differentiation had gone on, the same person might be both. Also with
increasing complexity of social and economic development it
became increasingly necessary to resort to jurisconsults and
to be represented by an advocate. Thus a patron who had
numerous clients in the older sense, when he had formed a
habit of answering questions and arguing cases might find
that others, not technically his clients, were resorting to him
to obtain the benefit of his knowledge, experience, and skill.
As he undertook to advise and represent them, they became
his clients to that extent and the term client came to have the
new meaning which it bears today.
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Public speaking was the high road to a political career.
The great men of the city sat in the courtyards of their houses
to give advice and the ambitious young men prepared themselves for a forensic career by attending and taking notes of
the advice given and by listening to the forensic exertions of
noted orators. At seventeen, the Roman youth laid aside the
dress of a boy (toga praetextata) and took on that of a man
(toga virilis). He then went to the forum with a company of
friends and was introduced by some distinguished citizen,
preferably of consular rank, as a practitioner in the courts.
The function of jurisconsult and that of advocate had already
begun to be differentiated by Cicero's time and well differentiated in the classical period.
In Cicero's time there were what we should regard as serious abuses of advocacy, such as might be expected from the
composition of the trial court in republican Rome. One of the
advantages of a permanent judiciary trained in law is that
it is not to be swayed from decision upon the law and the evidence by appeals to prejudice and emotion. In a common-law
trial the tendency to be moved by such appeals is mitigated by
the charge of the judge. In a Roman proceeding in judicio
there was nothing but the formula to hold in a judex who was
inclined to run away with the law. Accordingly, we see in some
of Cicero's speeches for the defense quite irrelevant rhetorical
devices for working upon the feelings of the tribunal, and he
tells of more than one case where such advocacy prevailed at
the expense of the law. Indeed, the advocate's dramatic efforts
were often supplemented by those of the parties and their
friends. An accused came before the tribunal dressed carefully for his part, sometimes accompanied by a swarm of
friends dressed in mourning in token of their sympathy and
sorrow. But these sorrowing friends might be brought in also
to intimidate the tribunal. Hence, it was found necessary to
forbid any appearing in that role beyond relatives within a
near degree.
Another abuse was extreme license of oral examination.
There was no law of evidence in our sense of that term, as,
indeed, there is not today in the Roman-law world. Any one
who had anything to say about the case could say his say for
what it was worth. There were rules as to the capacity of witnesses and as to quantum of proof, and witnesses who had
taken part in certain formal transactions (e.g. a formal con-
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veyance of property) were bound to appear and testify. Also,
the orators regularly argued that the uncorroborated evidence
of one witness ought not to suffice for conviction in a criminal
case and vouched the character, social position, or wealth of
witnesses in support of their credibility. But there were no
rules of admission or exclusion and the orator could examine
any number of prominent persons on their hearsay opinion
favorable to his client and set forth to the jury their high
standing as giving weight to this substitute for evidence. In
criminal cases it was a matter of course to bring in these
laudatores, or witnesses to charactei, and Cicero tells us that
to have less than ten of them was thought hardly respectable.
One need not say that for political reasons this sort of evidence
was given lightly and perfunctorily, yet might lead tribunals
away from the real case. It was prohibited in 52 B.C. by legislation at the instance of Pompey. But this legislation did not
endure. The older practice was restored after the triumph
of Caesar.
Cross examination was highly developed. The Roman advocate knew and the Roman books on advocacy taught, what
common-law advocates-well know, but even experienced advocates sometimes forget, namely, not to press cross examination
too far but to be content when they have the answer they
sought, and not to ask questions on cross examination on crucial points unless they know for certain what the answer
must be.
High water mark of Roman advocacy was attained in the
last period of the republic and the beginning of the empire.
The great advocates of the generation before Cicero and his
older contemporaries are known to us from Cicero's dialogue
de oratore. That dialogue, Cicero's orations, many of them
delivered before the tribunals, and Quintillian's treatise, de
institutione oratoria, are our chief authorities. The treatise
of Quintillian (c 35-95 A.D.) has been classical ever since and
is still worth reading by those who make a serious study of
the subject.
Later under the empire, although the development of the
law went forward, advocacy began to degenerate. In part, the
system of permanent judges and obsolescence of the popular
tribunals made for greater importance of the jurisconsult and
less of the advocate. In part, the development of law from the
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time of Cicero to the third century made for a certainty and
uniformity in which the role of sheer advocacy in bringing
about forensic results was continually less. Tacitus (c 55-120
A.D.) tells of the beginnings of this decadence. In place of the
rigorous training and apprenticeship of the advocates of the
late republic, he says that those who intended to become advocates formed no habits of study, took no pains to prepare
themselves, and pretended to despise knowledge of law as
something unnecessary for their calling. He says that they
cultivated declamation and ornaments of style and so delivered speeches after school models, filled with rhetorical commonplaces.
But this was not the worst. Pliny the Younger (61 or 62 c 113 A.D.) tells us that a bad practice had grown up of hiring
a claque to applaud forensic speeches, so that, he says in one
of his letters, if you wish to know how an advocate acquits
himself you do not need to listen to him. It is enough to wait
for the applause since you may be sure that the worst speaker
has the loudest applause. This advocate's claque may have
been a development of the crowd of supporters, the mourning
friends, and the character witnesses of an earlier time. If we
may believe Ammianus Marcellinus, a Roman historian of the
fourth century A.D., the advocates of that time both at Rome
and in the provinces, had fallen very low. No doubt his somewhat extravagant picture of them is in part a caricature. Yet
we must not forget that there is sometimes more truth in a
caricature than in a photograph.
In the fifth and sixth centuries, great improvements took
place which gave to advocacy something very like its modern
organization. Indeed, the modern continental organization is
simply a development of the Roman in this its final form. The
advocates ceased to be merely orators. They were not merely
trained in rhetoric. They had studied in one or another of the
law schools. A certain number was fixed for each court, and
those attached to a court formed a sort of corporation. The
law recognized the fees and fixed the scale. Professional discipline was provided for. Thus the main lines which exist
today had become established.
In the fifth century and first quarter of the sixth, legislation moves steadily toward a well organized bar for each
of the great courts. A statute of 468 prohibits the practice of
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advocacy by those not admitted to practice. One of 440 limits
the pretorian advocates to 150, and in 460 it is enacted that
the number shall not be raised beyond 150 by recognizing
assistants. In 469 a statute provides that there shall be 50 at
Alexandria; in 474, 64 are recognized to practice before the
pretorian prefect at Constantinople, and 15 are said to hold
first rank next after the advocates of the fisc or legal representatives of the government. In 486, 150 are provided for in
the prefecture of Illyria, and in 508, 30 in Syria. Meanwhile
a statute of 452 had provided for two advocates of the fisc (an
office which seems to go back to the reign of Hadrian) who
were to be lawyers of the highest reputation. In the sixth
century, the number of advocates before the pretorian prefect
at Constantinople was reduced to 80. But a certain number
of supernumeraries was allowed.
It remains to speak of the remuneration of advocates. In
the beginning, the patron advised his client and supported his
client's case or defended him because these were duties the
patron owed to one dependent upon him. In consequence, when
regular advocacy arose the assistance rendered to suitors in
the forum was gratuitous. Of necessity, however, as there
came to be a profession of advocates, requiring time and study
and preparation if one were to undertake another's case, and
as the client was no longer a dependent of a patron but one
who sought to employ the skill and training and experience
of an orator who stood in no relation to him, a practice sprang
up of paying a gratuity to the advocate. It was natural also
that those who had trained themselves for forensic exertion
should, in a changed social order, employ their skill and training and experience as a means of making money. But the old
idea was so strong that this was felt to be an abuse and a
statute known as the lex Cincia (204 B.C.) forbade any one
from accepting money or gift on account of pleading a case.
It must be remembered that under the republic the calling
of orator opened the way to the highest political preferment.
Those who followed it were in the public eye, and in any time
and place where office is held by tenure of popular election,
publicity is the politician's chief asset. Moreover, at this time
the orators were usually members of wealthy families. They
were men of rank and distinction with a strong sense of duty
and trained in the older ideas which made advocacy a duty
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to be performed without reward. They could well afford to
despise remuneration for a service done for quite different
motives than expectation of gain. Later, the ideas and motives
which made advocacy a gratuitously performed duty ceased
to exist. Political office no longer depended on popular election.
Advocates were no longer as a matter of course heads of
wealthy houses, scornful of gain. Men came to practice advocacy if not as a money-making calling, certainly as a means
of livelihood. Yet the lex Cincia stood as law, and, indeed,
Augustus reinforced it by procuring a xesolution of the Senate
prohibiting advocates from taking fees under penalty of a
fourfold forfeiture.
One need not say that such legislation could not be enforced, and Tacitus tells us of a debate in the Senate in the
reign of Claudius in which strong arguments were made for
remuneration of advocates. The old patrician houses had
passed or were passing. Those who were to come forward to
do the work of the state would have largely to do so by way
of the forum. Hence a strong legal profession was required
for other reasons than as an aid to the due administration of
justice. But to insure such a profession there must be a possibility of pursuing it in a society of individual competitive
acquisition. Claudius was moved' by such considerations and
fixed the maximum fee at 10,000 sesterces, or 100 aurei (about
$475) and made advocates liable to prosecution if they accepted more.
If you look at the statue of St. Yves, the patron saint of the
lawyers, a great advocate of thirteenth-century France, you
will see he carries in his left hand a bag marked 10,000, that
is, the 10,000 sesterces fixed as the maximum by the Roman
law. Thus the' medieval artist sought to bring home to us that
our patron saint was so great an advocate that every one
always gave him the maximum fee, and yet so honest and
law-abiding that he never took more.
In the decadence of advocacy, many abuses grew up as to
fees, such as accepting a gift by way of fee in advance and
then refusing to go on with the case, taking gifts by way of
fee from both sides, and taking bribes not to exert the advocate's best efforts. In consequence, in the reign of Trajan a
resolution of the Senate required an oath by both parties
before trial that they had not given or promised any sum of
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money to their advocates. Thus the fee, not exceeding the legal
amount was to be paid after trial. This regulation also proved
ineffective. In Justinian's codification in the sixth century we
find legislation from the third century on, which shows that
fees were habitually paid in advance and deals with the abuse
of receiving them and not conducting the case.
This history of the remuneration of advocates at Rome
has had a profound effect on remuneration of advocates in the
modern world. In the Middle Ages, when modern institutions
were formative, the Roman law was supposed by the learned
to be binding upon all Christendom. Later in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries it was held to be embodied reason.
Moreover, Quintillian's treatise, discussing the whole subject
of remuneration of advocates very sensibly, yet on the whole
took the traditional position that advocacy was a service gratuitously rendered for its own sake, for which the advocate
might honorably accept a fair honorarium, voluntarily bestowed on him as a gift, but for which no bargain as to compensation and nothing in the way of hire was permissible.
The influence of the great treatise of antiquity was decisive,
if anything more than the rule of the Roman law was needed.
III
The Development of Legal Advisors at RomeThe Jurisconsults
There were three purposes for which a lawyer might be
needed at Rome. First, one might need an agent or representative in the proceedings in inure; second, he might need a
trial lawyer in the proceedings in iudicio; third, he might need
an advisor as to wills and conveyances and formal transactions and as to his legal rights and duties. For the first he had
a procurator. For the second, he retained an orator or advocate. For the third, he consulted a jurisconsult. The Roman
jurisconsults have played a leading part in the development
not only of Roman law but of all law. Both from the standpoint of the history. of the legal profession and from that of a
lawyer's general culture, they deserve a whole lecture to themselves. But such a lecture would be nothing less than an
account of the development of Roman law from the generation
before Cicero to the end of the third century A.D. The great
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work of the jurisconsults was done as law writers and law
teachers.
After the Twelve Tables (450 B.C.) the form of the Roman
law was threefold: (1) The written law, the Twelve Tables;
(2) an undefined mass of uncodified tradition, and .(3) a growing mass of "interpretation."
Also there came to be a certain amount of legislation upon
legal matters (apparently none of it relating to private law)
and of interpretation of that legislation. Along with the still
uncodified tradition, the interpretation was handed down
traditionally in the pontifical college and connects with the
earlier time when social control was quite undifferentiated
and law was merged in religion.
Interpretation, i.e. the traditional development and application of the texts of the written law, handed down traditionally in the pontifical college; became the foundation of the
legal science of a later period. Except for occasional legislation, it was the way in which the law grew, although more
or less unconsciously, since men were slow to admit that they
could change the ancient customs deliberately and avowedly.
Except as codified in the Twelve Tables, down to the beginning of the fourth century B.C., law was a tradition possessed
exclusively by the patricians who alone were eligible to the
priesthood. The great men, who knew the tradition, sat in the
court of his house and advised his dependents, drew legal
documents for them, and, if need be, conducted causes for
them.
A new stage of legal development begins with the divulging of the traditional formulae of actions by the secretary of
Appius Claudius just before 304 B.C. Half a century later
(253 B.C.) the first plebeian pontifex maximus began to give
consultations in public, where students could listen and take
notes and learn the law as a subject of public study. Knowledge of the law ceased to be a matter of oral transmission of
tradition in the pontifical college. The traditional element in
the law became secularized. Those who knew the law gave
advice to all comers who might in their turn become learned
in the law and give counsel. In addition, those learned in the
law gave opinions to the judices, who were not learned in the
law and might require advice in applying the formula. These
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opinions, called responsa became increasingly important in
making and shaping the law so that Cicero enumerates jurisperitorum auctoritas,the authority of those learned in the law
among the forms of Roman law in his time. This development
of jurist-made law culminates in legislation whereby the opinions of the jurists acquired formal legal standing. Augustus
began the practice of licensing jurisconsults, who might then
give opinions on questions of law with the authority of the
emperor behind them. Later, Hadrian made the opinions of
the jurisconsults binding upon the judge, in case they were
agreed, though apparently only for the case in hand.
Throughout the classical era juristic writing was the chief
form of the law. In the republican period juristic writing
takes the form of commentaries on the ius ciuile, the law of
the city, or strict law, i.e. the Twelve Tables and the traditional law of the city as traditionally interpreted. Later came
commentaries on the edict and presently collections of responsa or opinions of jurisconsults on questions submitted to them.
Still later come commentaries on the writings of the great
jurists of the past and treatises on particular subjects or particular branches of the law. In addition, there were institutional treatises for students and practical handbooks. The
whole is a body of legal writing quite without parallel until
recent times, and standing in relation to the law as the literature of Greece has stood in relation to letters.
Along with writing, teaching became a major function of
the jurisconsult. Indeed, after the third century, when legislation superseded juristic writing as the growing point of the
law, the law teacher took the place of the practitioner-writer.
From that time in the civil law the jurisconsult is a law teacher.
Looking back over the development of law and the administration of justice at Rome and in the Roman world it will
be seen that the three main functions of the lawyer, the
agent's function, the advocate's function and the jurisconsult's function were well developed. Here as elsewhere in the
legal order, the Romans laid well the foundations upon whict
the Middle Ages and the modern world have built.
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